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PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
several large environmental damage actions, and multi-million dollar
settlements have followed the filing of other suits. These promising
results have been confined to a handful of the fifty states, however, and
such actions would not be possible under the procedural rules of most
states. Environmentalists should at least be aware that this alternative
to the federal forum exists. Perhaps they should tuam more energy
toward a modernization of state class action procedure and less toward
absurdly excessive federal actions that are not only doomed from the
outset but also prejudice all judges against class suits. Above all, re-
gardless of the forum, environmental lawyers must stop filing repre-
sentative actions solely for their shock value and instead restrict the
use of the class suit to cases that offer a reasonable chance for success.
The public has been made aware of ecological problems; now respons-




Planned Unit Development and
North Carolina Enabling Legislation
As North Carolina enters a period of rapid urban growth,' it is
important to recognize the possibilities for use of more dynamic means
of land use regulation. One new means of land use regulation and de-
velopment is the so-called planned unit development. It is the pur-
pose of this comment to discuss the possible use of planned unit de-
velopment in North Carolina under present zoning enabling legisla-
tion and supreme court decisions. Predictions about future land regula-
tion will be made following a review of the development of the
traditional means of land use regulation.
Land use regulations in the United States2 developed in three dis-
tinguishable periods since the beginnings of urbanization. From co-
lonial days to the 1920's, land use was controlled by nuisance ordi-
1. Between 1960 and 1970, the metropolitan population of North Carolina in-
creased by 23.8%. The urban population increased by 26.8%. U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
mRCE, STATISTICAL ABshACr OF THE UN TrED STATES 18 (1971).
2. See 8 E. McQmLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.03 (3d ed. 1965).
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nances, building regulations, and private restrictive covenants.8 Af-
ter the great surge toward urbanization around the turn of the cen-
tury, municipal officials became aware of the need for more standard-
ized regulation of land use and building construction. 4  The response
to the recognized need for comprehensive land use controls was zon-
ing.5 Several large cities enacted crude zoning ordinances prior to
1920,6 but the real beginning of the era of comprehensive zoning in
the United States was in 1926. In that year a Standard Zoning En-
abling Act was published by the United States Department of Com-
merce." By the 1930's most states had similar comprehensive acts,8
and by 1936, 1200 municipalities in the United States had adopted
comprehensive zoning plans.'
The second major development in 1926 was Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,'0 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld use re-
strictions in a local zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of police power.
In that case the Court reviewed the circumstances that made zoning
necessary:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with
great increases and concentration of population, problems have de-
veloped, and constantly are developing, which require, and will
continue to require, additional restrictions of the use and occupa-
tion of private lands in urban communities."L
Euclidean zoning, with its emphasis on segregation of uses, pre-
dictability of land development, and regulation of building construc-
tion in terms of height, bulk, and land area,12 has been the primary
means of land use regulation in North Carolina and the United States
for the past fifty years.'8
3. For a detailed account of the development of these theories, see P. GREEN,
ZONING IN NORTH CAROLINA 1-50 (1952).
4. E. BASSETr, ZONING 20-33 (1936).
5. For an interesting discussion of the term "zoning" see id. at 20-21.
6. Two of these were New York and Los Angeles. P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 52.
7. See Avsoav CoMm. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr UNDER WHICH MUNICnALmES MAY ADOPT ZONING REa-
ULATIONS (rev. ed. 1926).
8. P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 52.
9. E. BAssE-r, supra note 4, at 12.
10. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11. Id. at 386-87.
12. P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 53.
13. Id. at 52. North Carolina adopted zoning enabling legislation in 1923. Ch.




Traditional Euclidean zoning plans contain one or several residen-
tial, business, and industrial districts, the uses permitted i each dis-
trict being set out in the local ordinance. Other uses are normally ex-
cluded.14 In recent years critics, particularly urban planners, have
questioned the fundamental bases of Euclidean zoning and land de-
velopment. 1 Efforts have been made to create land use regulations
that are positive and dynamic rather than solely restrictive. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reflected the views of many modern planners
when it said of traditional Euclidean land development, "This general
approach to zoning fares reasonably well, so long as development takes
place on a lot-by-lot basis and so long as no one cares that the over-all
appearance of the municipality resembles the design achieved by
using a cookie cutter on a sheet of dough." 6 But planners have ques-
tioned more than just the esthetic shortcomings of the traditional zon-
ing techniques. Planners and sociologists alike question the real jus-
tification for segregation of types of land use in all but the zones of
lowest "dignity.' 1 7  Some have recommended means other than the
crude classification of use to determine the location and acceptability of
different types of development.'
The development of land use regulations in North Carolina fol-
lowed the pattern discussed above. The North Carolina General As-
14. One exception to the rule of exclusion arose in the development of the con-
cept of the "highest and best use" of land. Under this theory, single-family-residence
use of land was considered the highest and best. Multiple-family residence use might be
next, business use next, and industrial use last. The highest and best use doctrine
allowed land uses of greater dignity in zones below them, but did not allow lower uses
in zones reserved for higher ones. The result is that single family residences could be
located in any area of a municipality, while industry, at the bottom of the list of per-
mitted uses could be located only in the zone set out for it. See R. BABcocK, THE
ZONING GAME 126-37 (1966).
15. See, e.g. D. MANDELKER, Tim ZONING DILEMMA xiii (1971); Symposium, The
Urbanization Game, 36 J. Am. INsT. PLANNERS 2-58 (1970); Symposium: Planned Unit
Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 3 (1965).
16. Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 629, 241 A.2d 81, 83
(1968).
17. Segregation of the single-family housing area is said to be one primary reason
for the first institution of local zoning ordinances. R. BABcocK, supra note 14, at 3-4.
Allowance of many different uses in areas at the bottom of the scale of highest and
best use has always been permitted. Aloi, Legal Problems in Planned Unit Develop-
ment: Uniformity, Comprehensive Planning, Conditions and the Floating Zone, 1 REAL
ESTATE L.I. 5, 10 (1972); see Comment, Land Use Control in Metropolitan Areas: The
Failure of Zoning and a Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 335 (1972).
18. Among other types of land controls are: performance zoning, see P. Green,
Zoning and the Practicing Attorney 17-18, Oct. 9, 1959 (unpublished paper in the N.C.
Institute of Government Library); use of floating zones, see text accompanying note
114 infra; incentive zoning or bonuses, see Comment, Bonus or Incentive Zoning:
Legal Implications, 21 SYRAcusE L. REv. 895 (1970).
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sembly adopted the Model Zoning Enabling Act19 in 1923.20 That act
remains the source of zoning power for North Carolina municipalities.
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld this legislation against con-
stitutional attack in 1926,21 the year the Euclid decision was handed
down.
The North Carolina zoning enabling act may be analyzed in two re-
lated parts. The first part, which may be called the "authorization
sections," sets out the legislative grant of zoning power to municipali-
ties,22 establishes requirements that the municipalities be divided into
districts, 23 and recites certain goals or "purposes in view" for the
use of municipal zoning.24 The second part of the enabling act, which
may be called the "procedural sections," sets out the necessary pro-
cedures to be followed in adopting, amending, and enforcing munic-
ipal zoning ordinances and establishes a board of adjustment with
power to hear appeals of landowners and to grant exceptions and var-
iances. 25
The grant of police power is stated in traditional terms: the pur-
pose is to promote "health, safety, morals, or the general welfare."2
The section lists several means by which a municipality may regulate
land development and use. It may "[r]egulate and restrict the height,
number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the per-
centage of the lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and
other open spaces, density of population, and the location and use of
buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence and other
purposes. '
27
The act does not require a municipality to zone its land if it does
not choose to do so.2 Municipalities are free under their authority to
zone or not to zone as they see fit. The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals recently said:
[Tlhis court is bound by the well accepted principle that how a
19. See ADvIsorY CoMm. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMmERcE, A STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr UNDER WINcH MuiCnAmrws MAY ADOPT ZONING
REGULATIONS (rev. ed. 1926).
20. Ch. 250, [19231 N.C. Sess. L. 572, as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-381
to -388 (1972).
21. Hardin v. City of Raleigh, 192 N.C. 395, 135 S.E, 151 (1926).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1972).
23. Id. § 160A-382 (1972).
24. Id. § 160A-383 (1972).
25. Id. §§ 160A-384 to -392 (1972).
26. Id. § 160A-381 (1972).
27. Id.
28. In re Markham, 259 N.C. 566, 131 S.E.2d 329 (1963).
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city or town shall be zoned or rezoned and how various proper-
ties shall be classified or reclassified rests with the municipal leg-
islative body and its judgment is presumed to be reasonable and
valid and beyond judicial interference unless shown to be arbi-
trary, unreasonable or capricious. The burden of establishing such
arbitrariness is on the one asserting it.29
The North Carolina Supreme Court will not invalidate a properly
enacted zoning ordinance unless it "has no foundation in reason and
is a merely arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public
safety or the public welfare in its proper sense."8 0 The court will not
invalidate an ordinance that does not accomplish or specifically con-
tribute to all the purposes mentioned in the enabling act. "It is suffi-
cient that the legislative body of the city had reasonable ground upon
which to conclude that one or more of those purposes would be accom-
plished or aided by the amending ordinance." 31
It is clear from the cases that the North Carolina Supreme Court
interprets the grant of power to the municipalities as a very broad-
ranging one, subject to sanction only if the municipality acted unrea-
sonably or capriciously or outside the statutory procedures for enact-
ment and amendment of local zoning ordinances.8" The court has pro-
vided an appropriate summary of its view of its proper role in review-
ing zoning ordinances: "When the most that can be said against such
ordinances is that whether it was an unreasonable, arbitrary or un-
equal exercise of power is fairly debatable, the courts will not inter-
fere. '83  The importance of this permissive view of the grant-of-
power section is that there appears to be room for municipalities to
modify their traditional zoning schemes or to adopt more innovative
ones without exceeding the power granted them by the state. 4
The court allows municipalities significant latitude in the crea-
tion and alteration of districts within their zoning plans. The lan-
guage of the statute is expansive: a municipality may "divide [itself]
. . .into districts of any number, shape, and area that may be deemed
best suited to carry out the purpose of this Article; and within those
29. Allred v. City of Raleigh, 7 N.C. App. 602, 613, 173 S.E.2d 533, 540
(1970), rev'd on other grounds, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
30. In re Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938).
31. Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 436-37, 160 S.E.2d 325, 332
(1968).
32. Schloss v. Jamison, 262 N.C. 108, 136 S.E.2d 691 (1964).
33. In re Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938).
34. See E. BAssETr, supra note 4, at 13-17.
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districts it may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, recon-
struction, alteration, repair or use of buildings, structures, or land."38
Although the grant of zoning power is broad, a municipality that zones
land within its jurisdictional borders so as to eliminate all practical
uses for it violates the constitutional prohibitions against taking private
property without due process of law."0 "It is well settled, however,
that zoning cannot render private property completely valueless. ' '3 7
But it is also clear that a property owner has no right to have his prop-
erty zoned for the use that is the most desirable from an economic
point of view.38 The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that a
zoning amendment cannot deprive the owner of a rezoned lot of the
possibility of building a structure on that lot that would be "practical,
desirable, and of reasonable value."3 9
Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 160A-382 of
the General Statutes, the portion of the enabling act that authorizes the
division of the municipality into districts, there seems to be ample room
for municipalities to create zones within their area of jurisdiction that
are not in keeping with either the traditional Euclidean pattern of use
segregation or the concept of highest and best use. Only the adoption
of an ordinance or amendment that so restricted use as virtually to elim-
inate the value of a piece of property would be invalid.40
Two other provisions of the enabling act must be briefly noted.
Section 160A-382 contains the "uniformity requirement," which
states, "All regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of build-
ing throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may dif-
fer from those in other districts."' 41 The North Carolina Supreme Court
has not interpreted this provision. 42  It has been argued that the pro-
vision means that the uses or classes of buildings in a given zone must
be uniform.4 The California Court of Appeals rejected this argument
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382 (1972).
36. See Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
37. Roberson's Beverages, Inc. v. City of New Bern, 6 N.C. App. 632, 637, 171
S.E.2d 4, 7 (1969).
38. Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968).
39. Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 657, 122 S.E.2d 817, 825 (1961).
40. See Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961);
Roberson's Beverages, Inc. v. City of New Bern, 6 N.C. App. 632, 171 S.E.2d 4 (1969).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382 (1972).
42. See Decker v. Coleman, 6 N.C. App. 102, 169 S.E.2d 487 (1969), holding that
all areas of a municipality in the same class (for example, single-family residence class)
must be subject to the same zoning restrictions.
43. Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768,
773, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970).
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with respect to similar language in its enabling act when it said that
the uniformity required was uniformity of regulations, not of buildings,
and that as long as each type or class of structure or use within a zone
meets the same requirements, the zone can contain as many differ-
ent uses as the local legislative body finds desirable.44 This holding
by the California court can be justified in terms of modem land de-
velopment theory and traditional Euclidean concepts. A require-
ment that all uses in a zone be the same would greatly limit many land
development options, including planned unit developments, which
rely on the predetermined mixing of several uses that complement each
other. It would also do violence to the principle of highest and best
use.
4 6
Finally, section 160A-383 requires that all zoning ordinances and
amendments be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."4  The
North Carolina courts have interpreted this requirement to mean only
that all the area within the jurisdiction must be within some district set
out in the zoning ordinance.48 There is some debate, to be discussed
in detail below, as to the necessary scope of the comprehensive plan. 9
The North Carolina courts have given a liberal interpretation to the
requirement of the "authorization sections" of the zoning enabling act.
Municipalities are permitted to proceed with the enactment, change,
and enforcement of their own ordinances as long as they follow pro-
cedures set out in the statute and as long as their action is not arbi-
trary or capricious50 It is still clear, however, that the enabling act
and virtually all local ordinances contemplate traditional Euclidean
single-lot land development. Planners trained to view land develop-
ment as part of an integrated social, environmental, and economic sys-
tee 1 argue that the single-lot, single-use type of land development
and regulation is no longer valid in all circumstances. One commen-
tator has written:
The most serious obstacle in the path of these new ideas is the or-
44. Id. at 773, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
45. See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
46. It will be recalled that the zones of lowest dignity under highest and best
use could contain any of the uses for the zones ranked above them. See note 14 supra.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-383 (1972).
48. Allred v. City of Raleigh, 7 N.C. App. 602, 607, 173 S.E.2d 533, 536 (1970),
rev'd on other grounds, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
49. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
50. Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
51. See Altshuler, The Goals of Comprehensive Planning, 31 J. AM. INST. PLAN-
NERs 186 (1965); Friedmann, A Response to Altshuler, Comprehensive Planning As a
Process, 31 J. AM. INST. PLANNERs 195 (1965).
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thodox zoning and subdivision regulations that swept the country
in the twenties. These ordinances were-and in most instances
still are-bottomed on the assumption that dwellings must be seg-
regated by type, that creation and maintenance of open space is
solely a function of government, and that the home building busi-
ness is conducted by master craftsmen who merely construct a
single house on a single lot.52
Several of the bases for the wide acceptance of Euclidean zoning
are not as significant today as they were in the 1920's. In the last
few decades the building construction industry has changed from
s~ingle-lot construction to subdivision development. Six of seven
homes built in 1958 were constructed by a developer for sale rather
than on order by the final user.5 3 Well over half of all new construc-
tion is now done by builders who build more than 100 houses a year.5 4
Heightened awareness of the adverse environmental impact of much
traditional subdivision development has caused some observers to
call for the use of land development techniques that complement, or
at least co-exist with, the natural state of the land. 5  Some studies of
urban areas suggest that neighborhoods containing a mix of uses
tend to be less likely to succumb to urban blight and decay than
those containing only one type of use.56
These factors, the change in the make-up of the building construc-
tion industry and heightened environmental awareness, together with a
recognized need for housing,57 have caused both planners and develop-
ers to advocate the use of planned unit development, which has been
described as "a tract of land absolved from conventional zoning to per-
mit clustering of residential uses and perhaps compatible commercial




The Kentucky Court of Appeals also has described a planned unit
52. Babcock, An Introduction to the Model Enabling Act for Planned Unit De-
velopment, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 136 (1965).
53. Hanke, Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv.
15, 16 (1965).
54. Id.
55. Bell, Controlling Residental Development on the Urban Fringe: St. Louis
County, Missouri, 48 J. URnAN LAw 409 (1971); Sussna, Environmental Control and
Land Use, 48 J. URBAN LAw 689 (1971).
56. J. JACOBs, TIHE DEATH AND LwE. oF GRAT AMEIRiCAN Crn-s 143-238
(1961).
57. Housing experts estimate that over 20 million new housing units would be
needed between 1967 and 1977. PREsIDENT oF Ti UNrrrD STATES, FmiST ANNUAL
REPORT ON NATzONAL HousING GOALS, H.R. Doc. No. 63, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 48-53
(1969).
58. Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 2d 768, 772,
90 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970).
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development as a "group of dwellings constructed according to plan
on a tract of at least two acres. . . , having topographical and envi-
ronmental conditions such as to justify a departure from the strict
requirements of the zoning ordinance as to lot sizes, set-back lines,
yard spaces, etc." 59 The Federal Housing Administration will assist in
financing the construction of planned unit developments meeting its
definition: "[A] residential land subdivision of individually owned
homes with neighborhood owned open areas and recreation facili-
ties."00 One advocate offers the following description:
Planned unit development is a concept designed to avoid most of
the unfortunate results of uniform housing development. The
planned unit enables the builder to create, within the confines
of a sizable development, a variety of housing types which will
broaden and diversify his market while at the same time enhanc-
ing the possibilities of attractive environmental design and provid-
ing the public with open spaces and other common facilities.61
Unfortunately, the aspect of planned unit development that most
excites the planners and developers is that which causes the greatest
legal problems in terms of traditional zoning: where the Euclidean
system calls for construction of a single unit on a single lot, each meeting
uniform height, set-back, and area limitations, often on a grid street
plan, one primary technique for the creation of a planned unit develop-
ment is the clustering of residential units and combining of open space.
"Cluster developments . . .place multi-family units around common
open space. Clustering can preserve scenic beauty by maintenance
of open spaces as parks or natural areas, reducing [the number of]
roads, [developed] beaches and docks through shared facilities, and
careful site planning and landscaping. Grouped dwellings also facili-
tate installation of sewer and water systems." 62  Sharing of common
areas and facilities is said to reduce construction costs and sale prices
of homes. The practice also provides small private yards, reducing
the necessity of spending time maintaining them, and provides large
common green areas and neighborhood recreation areas.63  It has
been suggested that the inclusion within planned unit developments of
housing units of differing costs might serve to create within the unit
59. Mann v. City of Fort Thomas, 437 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Ky. 1969).
60. Hanke, supra note 53, at 18.
61. Lloyd, A Developer Looks at Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
3, 4 (1965).
62. Kusler, Artificial Lakes and Land Subdivisions, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 369, 408.
63. Hanke, supra note 53, at 19.
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community an economic and racial cross section of residents."4 From
its description, particularly its description by planners who advocate
its use, the planned unit development seems a valuable land develop-
ment option. However, in spite of the possible advantages of such
developments to builders, home buyers, and the community, the tech-
nique has only recently come to the forefront as a housing construc-
tion option.
The concept is not in itself new. New York enabling legislation
has authorized planned unit development zoning for forty years,00 al-
though the authority was not tested in court until 1961.0 Several states
have adopted similar enabling legislation,0 7 and a few municipalities
in North Carolina have ordinances that purport to provide for planned
unit development or its equivalent. 8
Planned unit development ordinances have also been upheld when
they were enacted under the authority granted municipalities under
"home rule" provisions, which are constitutional or statutory allowances
to municipalities, and in some instances to counties, to manage many
of their own affairs that otherwise would be controlled by the state leg-
islature. Home-rule provisions might be seen as open-ended enabling
legislation. Where an enabling act provides a municipality with a
grant of power in one specific area, a home-rule provision grants pow-
ers over a broad range of municipal affairs. A home-rule provision
has been defined as establishing "the autonomy of local government
in the sovereign state over purely local matters."0 9 With such a grant of
power, municipalities can enact local zoning ordinances, among them
planned unit development ordinances.
While none of the planned unit development ordinances of North
Carolina municipalities have been challenged in court, several Ameri-
can courts have litigated the appropriateness of planned unit develop-
64. For a discussion of integration in planned unit developments, see Mandelker,
Reflections on the American System of Planning Controls: A Response to Professor
Kilasnowiecki, 114 U. PA. L. lv. 98 (1965).
65. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established
Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L REV. 47, 48 (1965).
66. Id. at 80-84.
67. J. KASNOWIECKI, LEW, AsPEcrs OF PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEVELOP-
mNT 13 (Urban Land Institute Technical Bull. No. 52, 1965).
68. See, e.g., HENDERSONvILLE, N.C., ZONING ORDINA CE art. VII (1966); RA-
LEIGH, N.C., ZONING ORDINANCE § 24-31.1 (1968); cf. IGH POINT, N.C., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 22-3.3B (1962).
69. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 269, 280 (1968). This entire article is an excellent review of the development
of home rule in the United States.
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ments and their relationship to traditional zoning ordinances. Al-
though these cases do not establish any universal legal principles, they
do present alternative ways that courts have dealt with planned unit de-
velopment ordinances. In states that have planned unit development
enabling statutes or home-rule provisions, planned unit developments
implemented in compliance with the procedural requirements of valid
local ordinances have been upheld. 70  Developments that are not in
compliance with procedural requirements will be found in violation of
the zoning ordinance. 7' Where procedural requirements have been
met, developments have been held infirm for failure to meet area and
open-space requirements set out in the local ordinance itself.72 One
New Jersey decision held against the developer when his planned unit
development proposal anticipated more commercial uses than would be
necessary for the needs of the expected residents of the unit.
7 3
While ordinances and construction have been upheld in states
with planned unit development enabling statutes or home-rule provi-
sions, the result in states, such as North Carolina, with neither of these
provisions is not easy to predict. Some North Carolina cases, how-
ever, indicate how the supreme court might react to various methods
of planned unit development implementation in North Carolina with-
out the adoption of a specific enabling statute.
One possible method of implementation without adopting an en-
abling provision would be through the use of a special exception (or
special use permit), a device that allows the local municipal board
of adjustment 4 to permit certain enumerated non-conforming uses in
zoning districts. This procedure allows some flexibility in otherwise
rigid zoning plans. The requirements for the special exception must
be pre-determined and contained in the ordinance.7 For example,
a duplex housing unit might be allowed in a single family residential
70. Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768, 90
Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (home rule); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 CaL App. 2d
412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969) (home rule); Moore v. City of Boulder, 29 Colo. App.
248, 484 P.2d 134 (1971) (home rule); Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, 429 Pa.
626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968) (home rule); Beall v. Montgomery County Council, 240 Md.
77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965) (enabling act).
71. Millbrae Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 162 Cal. App. 2d
222, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1971); Mann v. City of Fort Thomas, 437 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. App.
1969); Dover Township Homeowners & Tenants Ass'n v. Township of Dover,
114 N.J. Super. 270, 276 A.2d 156 (1971).
72. Rudderow v. Township Comm., 114 N.J. Super. 104, 274 A.2d 854 (1971).
73. Id.
74. The authorization for the board of adjustment and its responsibilities are set
out in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-388 (1972).
75. 8 E. McQuiLL N, supra note 2, § 25.160.
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zone if that unit were on a lot of larger size than the minimum for the
single family unit. "The fundamental purpose of the special exception
or use is to serve in an ancillary role as an allocator of land use, and is
generally used to accomplish use changes without the intervention of a
formal amendment of a zoning ordinance. ' '70  The municipal board of
adjustment has the authority to hear and rule on requests for special
exceptions. 77 The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently held that
the power to hear requests for exceptions carries with it a requirement
that the board grant the exception if the applicant meets the standards
set by the ordinance. In Keiger v. Winston-Salem Board of Adjust-
ment78 the court reversed a denial by the board of adjustment of a spe-
cial use permit for construction of a trailer park in a residential area.
The board had found that the proposed trailer park met the "site" and
"other physical" requirements called for in the ordinance, but denied
the permit because the use proposed was not in the "public interest."
The court found that this determination was an unauthorized exercise
of legislative function by the board and thus violated the constitutional
rights of the developer. The importance of this case for planned unit
developments is that the North Carolina court appears to be willing to
allow unitary developments under the special exception power of the
board of adjustment.
Although the use of special exceptions is a possible way of allow-
ing multi-unit developments in areas where the zoning ordinance does
not expressly provide for them, it is not a sufficient means to imple-
ment planned unit developments. The reason for this is that the char-
acteristic virtue of the planned unit development is its potential for
tailoring land use to the specific topographical and housing needs of the
community in which the unit is located. 9 It is unrealistic to expect a
local governing board to anticipate both the needs of the community
and projects that might be proposed and to adopt special exception
standards to permit them. Implementation of a planned unit develop-
ment depends on bargaining between the developer and the munici-
76. Id. § 25.160 (Supp. 1972).
77. N.C. GiEN. STAT. § 160A-388(c) (1972); see Green, The Power of the Zoning
Board of Adjustment to Grant Variances from the Zoning Ordinance, 29 N.C.L. Rv.
245 (1951). The Maryland Supreme Court has, in one case analogized an application
for adoption of a floating zone to an application for an exception. The court found
that requirements for the granting of an exception were not met, and refused imple-
mentation of the requested zoning change. Aubinoe v. Lewis, 250 Md. 645, 244 A.2d
879 (1968).
78. 278 N.C. 17, 178 S.E.2d 616 (1971).
79. Krasnowiecki, supra note 65, at 77.
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pality to determine the requirements and allowances of the project.
It is clear that such activities are outside the power of the board of ad-
justment.80 A board of adjustment that undertakes to alter the stand-
ards under which it operates to accommodate or to defeat a proposed
project oversteps its "quasi-judicial" function and engages in a pro-
hibited legislative one."'
A problem similar to that of special exceptions is raised by North
Carolina subdivision regulations.82 Section 160A-372 of the General
Statutes requires a municipality to approve a preliminary subdivision
plat and allows the municipality to require as a condition of approval
the subsequent submission of a final plat "to show sufficient data to
determine readily and reproduce accurately on the ground the loca-
tion, bearing, and length of every street and alley line, lot line, ease-
ment boundary line, and other property boundaries .... 83 The re-
quirement of a final plat prior to approval of the plan and issuance
of building permits would greatly restrict possible modification of the
plan to meet unanticipated circumstances. This would be particularly
true in a planned unit development designed to be developed in stages
over several years.
In spite of the limitations created by special exception procedures
and subdivision requirements, a developer may still win approval of a
unitary development in areas where it normally would not be permitted.
In Carter v. City of Chapel Hill 4 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
upheld the granting of a use permit for the construction of a forty-unit
housing development in a single-family-residence zone. The court
cited the trial court's finding of fact that the plan was approved by the
local planning board and the town council and that it would not mate-
rially endanger health or safety if located and built according to the plan
submitted. It also found that the development was not injurious to
80. Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E.2d 128 (1946). The board
of adjustment has a power to grant variances as well as exceptions. Where an ex-
ception is granted when a proposed development meets pre-determined requirements in
the ordinance, a variance will issue upon demonstration of petitioner that he will suf-
fer a hardship if he is not allowed to make use of his property as he requests. An
example of a variance is where petitioner requests relief from a back yard minimum
requirement to build an addition to his house as a bedroom for his invalid mother who
is unable to climb stairs.
81. Keiger v. Winston-Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 278 N.C. 17, 178 S.E.2d 616
(1971).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-371 to -376 (1972).
83. Id. § 160A-372 (1972).
84. 14 N.C. App. 93, 187 S.F_2d 588, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 897
(1972).
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neighboring property or property values and did not violate the com-
prehensive plan for the municipality., One should note that in this
case the development was relatively small and was to be constructed
at one time rather than in stages. The development was located in a
residential district and did not contain any commercial or industrial
uses. Although this case and the Keiger case clearly show that large,
unitary developments of a residential nature can be allowed under the
present North Carolina statutes,"6 the use of the special exception ap-
proach seems limited.
A more complete provision for implementation might be for
North Carolina municipalities to create planned unit development zones.
It is clear that the North Carolina court's approach to zoning would
permit a municipality to create a zone designed to accommodate several
compatible uses. The placement of this zone on the city zoning map
is the most serious problem. Of course, a municipality in zoning or re-
zoning might set aside one area for planned unit development and then
simply wait for a developer to purchase and develop that property.
The peculiar flexibility of design of planned unit developments, how-
ever, would seem to require more freedom of location selection by a
developer than would be allowed if the zones were preestablished.
Placement of such zones on the zoning map prior to actual develop-
ment proposals would tend to limit the variety of designs and use mixes
possible in a planned development by restricting it to one part or area
of the community.
Municipalities in North Carolina have the power to rezone land
under their jurisdiction so long as changed conditions of the area dic-
tate that such changes would be in accordance with a comprehensive
plan of the area and if "the conditions existing at the time of the pro-
posed change are [ones that] would have originally justified the pro-
posed action ... ."7 Rezoning that does not meet this test, e.g.,
because it is effected by agreement or "contract" with a landowner, is
invalid. Similarly, zoning to accommodate the wishes or needs of one
property owner without other justification is municipal legislation
without a public purpose. In the vernacular of municipal affairs, the
former of these is called "contract zoning"; 88 the latter, "spot zon-
85. Id.
86. See text accompanying notes 28-50 supra.
87. Walker v. Town of Elkin, 254 N.C. 85, 89, 118 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1961); see
Allgood v. Town of Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 189 S.E.2d 255 (1972).
88. See text accompanying notes 90-100 infra.
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lug."' 9 The North Carolina courts have recently reaffirmed that both
spot and contract zoning are illegal under the enabling statutes.
Contract zoning occurs when the municipal legislative body cre-
ates or alters a zoning regulation on the basis of an agreement with the
owner of the land whereby the owner undertakes to meet certain con-
ditions not required of other owners of property similarly zoned. Con-
tract zoning is conceptually objectionable as an impermissible contract-
ing away of the municipality's police power. A California court has
defined contract zoning as occurring when a landowner agrees to per-
form certain conditions not imposed on other land in the same classi-
fication. 90
An example of impermissible contract zoning is the case of Decker
v. Coleman.91 In that case the North Carolina Court of Appeals invali-
dated a zoning change from "residential" to "highway commercial."
The change was found to be based on an agreement by the property
owner to establish and maintain a buffer zone of trees between his
property and that adjacent to it. This extra condition, not required
of other highway commercial property, made the zoning change Me-
gal.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has distinguished impermissible
contract zoning from permitted conditional zoning. In Buckholz v.
City of Omaha92 the court upheld rezoning of land from low-density
residential to shopping-center use upon the developer's signing of
covenants agreeing to improve the property according to a plan sub-
mitted by him and approved by the town. The plan and its approval
were admittedly inducements for the rezoning. This type of condi-
tional rezoning has been defended as an "outgrowth of the need for
compromise between the interests of the developer seeking appropriate
zoning changes for his tract, and the neighboring landowner whose
property interests would suffer if the most intensive use permitted of the
new classification were instituted."9 3  Several other courts have up-
held reasonable conditions on zoning changes. The California Court
of Appeals, in upholding rezoning with conditions, reasoned that
"conditions imposed on the grant of land use applications are valid
89. See text accompanying notes 101-07 infra.
90. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872,
878 (1969).
91. 6 N.C. App. 102, 169 S.E.2d 487 (1969).
92. 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
93. Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning-, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 267, 280 (1969).
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if reasonably conceived to fulfill public needs emanating from the land-
owner's proposed use."94
In two recent cases the North Carolina Supreme Court has clearly
indicated that it does not accept any distinction between conditional
and contract zoning." The court has invalidated zoning changes when
evidence indicated that the rezoning decision was based upon consid-
eration of specific proposed uses in the rezoned area. The court found
contract zoning in these cases without finding any contract or specific
agreement concerning the use of the land. In Allred v. City of Ra-
leigh,9 6 the court invalidated a zoning amendment changing a single-
family-residence district to one permitting apartments. The court
found that when the district was rezoned, the city council had before
it, and relied on, proposals for construction in the district of several lux-
ury apartments. The court found that the council based its rezoning
decision on the appropriateness and desirability of the area for those
specific apartments, and not for all uses allowed in the new zone.
The court said:
Rezoning on consideration of assurances that a particular tract or
parcel will be developed in accordance with restricted approved
plans is not a permissible ground for placing the property in a zone
where restrictions of the nature prescribed are not otherwise re-
quired or contemplated. Rezoning must be effected by the ex-
ercise of legislative power rather than by special arrangements
with the owner of a particular tract or parcel of land.
97
One year after it decided Allred, the North Carolina Supreme Court
handed down Blades v. City of Raleigh,8 which reached a similar re-
sult. In that case several residents of an area affected by a zoning
change brought an action to have the change set aside on the grounds
that it constituted both contract and spot zoning. The court over-
turned the zoning amendment on both grounds. To justify its finding
of contract zoning, the court listed the factors that the developer had
cited as changed conditions warranting an amendment to rezone a dis-
trict from single-family-residence zone to an apartment zone. All of
94. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 412, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872,
879 (1969).
95. Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972); Allred v. City
of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
96. 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971). For a thorough discussion of the
Allred case, see Note, Spot and Contract Zoning-An Appeal for Clarity, 51 N.C.L. REv.
1132 (1973).
97. 277 N.C. at 545, 178 S.E.2d at 441.
98. 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972).
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these were rejected as insufficient to justify the change.99 The court
followed AlIred, noting that nothing in the record indicated that the
council had considered uses other than the specific project proposed
by the developer. The court found "that the amending ordinance was
adopted solely because the applicant convinced the Council that it
would use the property for the construction of town houses as specifi-
cally described." 100 Blades indicates one reason why the North Carolina
court seems so uncompromising on conditional or contract zoning.
An area could be rezoned with one use contemplated and without any
consideration of how other uses, also permitted in the new zone,
might affect the area involved. This possibility and the prohibition
against contracting away of municipal police power are considered suf-
ficient grounds to void zoning changes that appear to be tainted by re-
liance on specific plans or agreements.
The North Carolina view of contract zoning raises significant prob-
lems when applied to planned unit developments, which are by defi-
nition a mix of several of the traditional land use classifications. A
planned unit development ordinance could be written to eliminate all
other possible uses, which would then not be in the contemplation of
the municipal board as it acted on the rezoning request. For exam-
ple, if a zone were set out that allowed only planned unit develop-
ments its effect would be similar to the typical highest residential
zones, which allow no other use within their boundaries. If there were
no other uses possible in a zone, the problems of passing of a zoning
amendment without consideration of other possible uses in the area
would be eliminated. Alternatively, the developer could try to insure
that consideration of other possible uses was in the record of the pro-
ceedings. In one of these two ways, a developer might avoid invalida-
tion of his zoning request on the grounds of consideration of a specific
project to the exclusion of any others.
The other side of the AlIred-Blades holdings presents a more dif-
ficult hurdle for the developer proposing a planned unit development.
While he might be successful in showing consideration of other possi-
ble uses, he must also show that the change was not fcr or on account of
his specific proposal. When a developer wants a zoning change for a
specific project that may contain a mixture of uses, the board is left in
the unenviable position of determining whether conditions allow the
rezoning of an area for a planned unit development without relying on
99. Id. at 547-48, 187 S.E.2d at 44-45.
100. Id. at 550, 187 S.E2d at 46.
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knowledge of the specific uses and structures to be contained in it.
While such a determination may be made for rezoning from one sin-
gle-use district to another, a zone containing a combination of uses not
tied to traditional street and spacing requirements seems to call for
consideration of the specific proposal. Such consideration is not al-
lowed under Blades and Allred. The result could well be that munici-
palities simply will not approve rezoining to accommodate planned
unit development projects.
Placement of planned unit development zones would be suscepti-
ble to the charge of "spot zoning," which has been defined as a "proc-
ess of singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification to-
tally different from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the
owner of such property and to the detriment of the other owners
... ,"101 One prominent North Carolina authority has listed several
factors that a court should consider in deciding wehther a zoning amend-
ment creates spot zoning. These are:
(a) the small size of the parcel, (b) the fact that it is in single
ownership, (c) the fact that there is nothing physically to distin-
guish it from abutting properties. Countervailing factors include:
(a) the existence of a comprehensive plan showing the property
is to be developed for the stated purpose, (b) the existence of
formal policies or standards under which the property would qual-
ify for this treatment, (c) the property's proximity to other prop-
erty similarly zoned. None of these factors, pro or con, is deter-
minative.102
In the Blades case, in which the court found an example of spot
zoning, the facts showed a relatively small tract of land owned by a sin-
gle person and surrounded by a larger area identically zoned as the
area proposed to be rezoned. The court concluded that it was "be-
yond the authority of the municipality, in the absence of a clear show-
ing of a reasonable basis for such distinction . . ." to alter the zoning
of the area involved. 0 3 The New York Court of Appeals in Rodgers
v. Village of Tdrrytown'04 reached a different result. "If . . . an
ordinance is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan,
it is not 'spot zoning,' even though it (1) singles out and affects but
101. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 123, 96 N.E.2d 731, 734
(1951).
102. P. Green, Recent Developments in North Carolina Zoning Law, Jan. 29, 1971
(unpublished paper in N.C. Institute of Government Library); see Walker v. Town of
Elkin, 254 N.C. 85, 118 S.E.2d 1 (1960) (leading case); Zopfi v. City of Wilmington,
273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968).
103. Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972).
104. 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
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one small plot ... or (2) creates in the center of a large zone small
areas of districts devoted to a different use."10 5  It is clear that the
size of an area is not in itself determinative. If conditions exist that al-
low it, the rezoning of an area as small as one lot may be upheld, 1'
while a change in the zone of a large tract may be invalidated.'07 The
combination of all the factors listed above determines whether a zon-
ing change constitutes spot zoning.
The conceptual basis for attack on spot zoning is that an amend-
ment permitting uses for a single owner of a tract that are denied to
owners under similar circumstances without further reason is legisla-
tion without a public purpose. It is axiomatic that such legislation is
impermissible and invalid.' 0
An amendment establishing a planned unit development zone and
replacing a more traditional zone would survive the requirements set
out in Blades only if the developer could show that conditions of the
rezoned and surrounding property had changed so as to support his
requested zoning change and that a planned unit development zone
might have been placed there when the original zoning ordinance was
passed if similar conditions had then existed.1 9 While properly en-
acted zoning ordinances are presumptively valid, 1 0 both Blades and
Allred appear to place the burden on the developer to make a rec-
ord before the governing board showing no circumstances of contract
or spot zoning."
105. Id. at 124, 96 N.E.2d at 735.
106. See, e.g., Episcopal Foundation v. Williams, 281 Ala. 363, 202 So. 2d 726
(1967) (one lot not spot zoning); City of Tulsa v. Mobley, 454 P.2d 901 (Okla. 1969)
(one block not spot zoning); Vladimirs Ukranian Orthodox Church v. Fun Bun, Inc.,
3 Pa. Cmwlth. 394, 283 A.2d 308 (1971) (one lot not spot zoning).
107. See, e.g., Chrobuck v. Snohomish Co., - Wash. - 480 P.2d 489 (1971) (635
acres held spot zoning); Perkins v. Marion County, 252 Ore. 313, 448 P.2d 374 (1968)
(55 acres held spot zoning).
108. 8 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 2, § 25.68.
109. See text accompanying note 87 supra. Several courts have held that the
requirement of changed conditions need not be met in the planned unit development
situation, if the residential density of the proposed unit is no greater than that of the
zone it is replacing. Planned Unit Development and Floating Zones, 7 REAL PROP.
TRUST & PROBATE J. 61, 62 (1972); see, e.g., Beall v. Montgomery County Council, 240
Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965).
110. Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
111. It is noteworthy that the court in both Blades and Allred point out that the
record before the City Council indicated that the board did not consider uses other
than those proposed in reaching their rezoning decisions. This suggests that if a de-
veloper presented the other possible uses as well as the one that he desired, placing
consideration of them into the record, he might prevail. The North Carolina Supreme
Court recently upheld a zoning amendment which changed part of a residential district
to a shopping center district. The court specifically upheld the lower court's determi-
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The problems of spot and contract zoning have been litigated in
North Carolina in the context of traditional zoning changes, such as
the rezoning of residential property to commercial property. These
cases deal with the replacing of one zone existing on the city zoning
map with another map-located zone. The authority of a municipality
to rezone in this manner is unquestioned." 2 However, such an ac-
cepted method of rezoning would not be effective to provide for
planned unit development zones. Although a municipal planning or
governing body can anticipate where business, traditional residential,
and industrial growth will occur and can zone to control it, planned
unit development growth cannot really be projected. Such develop-
ment requires a combination of planning, capital, and land united at the
same time and place with a mixture of uses that is far more complex
than most traditional development. If a municipality rezoned for
planned unit development in one area exclusively and waited for a de-
veloper to come in, the action may be liable to attack as the equiva-
lent of an unconstitutional taking.113 Rezoning that leaves the prop-
perty owner with no possible opportunity to develop his propetry
may be found invalid. Zoning changes that greatly restrict the uses
to which property may be put have also been held invalid. In an
area zoned exclusively for planned unit development, the owner of a
single lot might find that any development on his single lot may not
be allowed under the ordinance. The creation of a zone that allowed
other uses as well as planned unit development use would probably
result in an area containing the other kinds of development. For ex-
ample, if a zone permitted traditional commercial uses on single lots
as well as planned unit development, unless a developer were prepared
to begin his development immediately after the zoning change, he might
well be faced with an area containing several single-lot commercial
buildings. Such development would, at the very least, make accumu-
lation of land for planned unit development much more expensive.
The answer to the problem of providing a location for a planned unit
development is not to outguess the developer with a map-located zone
but to create a floating zone.
nation that changed conditions warranted the zoning change. Allgood v. Town of
Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 189 S.E.2d 255 (1972).
112. Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
113. See Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 178 S.E.2d 817 (1961); Rober-
son's Beverages, Inc. v. City of New Bern, 6 N.C. App. 632, 171 S.E.2d 4 (1969).
But see Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 60, 133 A.2d 83, 90 (Ct. App.
1957), allowing zoning as a method of preserving a "reservoir of future land uses"
by placing land in a zone with a very low maximum density requirement.
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"In general, floating zones are special-use districts, unlocated on
the zoning map, for purposes consistent with the comprehensive plan
for the development of the municipality such as shopping centers,
garden apartments and light industry.""' 4  A floating zone is de-
scribed in the zoning ordinance, but is not located on the city zoning
map. It "floats" above the municipality waiting to be placed by zon-
ing amendment. It is clear that the use of a floating zone is a better
method of placing planned unit developments in a municipality than
attempted anticipation of where they might be located. Under the float-
ing zone approach, a developer could select a site for his develop-
ment suited to its needs and then appeal for a zoning amendment.
Although he would still be liable to attack under charges of spot and
contract zoning, if his selection of site was carefully made and condi-
tions existed that would permit the rezoning, and if he made a careful
and complete record before the local governing body, he could pre-
vail."65
The use of floating zones, however, raises conceptual questions
under the enabling act. One major objection is that the imposition of
a floating zone onto an otherwise complete zoning map is zoning not
"in accordance with a comprehensive plan" as required by the enabling
act." 6 The North Carolina Supreme Court has in one instance decided
a "floating zone" case. In Armstrong v. Mclnnis" 7 the court upheld
a municipal ordinance that rezoned residential property to a planned
industrial park classification. The industrial park zone was set out in
the zoning ordinance, but was not located on the zoning map before it
was placed." 8 The court upheld the rezoning, but did not speak to the
question of the use of a floating zone.'1 9 The briefs before the court
did not argue or even mention floating zones, and the phrase does not
appear in the court's opinion. The use of floating zones to implement
planned unit developments remains an unresolved question before the
North Carolina court. Other state courts have, however, spoken to the
use of floating zones. The New Jersey Supreme Court has rejected
the use of floating zones as not in accordance with a comprehensive
114. Aloi, supra note 17, at 19. For a review of literature about floating zones,
see id. at 19 n.23.
115. See text accompanying notes 87-111 supra.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-383 (1972); see Rockhill v. Township of Chester-
field, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957).
117. 264 N.C. 616, 142 S.E.2d 670 (1965).
118. HIGH PoINT, N.C., CODE op ORiNnA-cns § 22-16.2 (1962).
119. Brief for Appellant, Brief for Appellee, Armstrong v. McInnis, 264 N.C. 616,
142 S.E.2d 670 (1965).
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plan.120  In Rockhill v. Township of Chesterfield.2 1 the court deter-
mined that the comprehensive plan covered only the territorial
boundaries of the area of municipal zoning control and that a zone not
present on that map was outside and thus not in accordance with the
plan.
1 22,
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Eves v. Zoning Board
of Adjustment 28 rejected the use of floating zones as the "antithesis of
zoning in 'accordance with a comprehensive plan.' ",124 In later cases,
the Pennsylvania court has allowed the equivalent of floating zones if
the period between the creation and placement of the zone was not in-
ordinately long.125  The court has chosen to distinguish rather than to
overrule its prior holdings. 26 It determined that the zoning amend-
ment in the Eves case created a "'floating zone,' anchored only upon
case by case application by land owners"'127 and that this method of re-
zoning was not in accordance with a comprehensive plan. In Donahue
v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, the court decided that when the gov-
erning board's action placing the new zone followed that of creating
it by only six weeks, the ordinances should be read as one enactment. 12
The board's action was thus treated as the equivalent of the creation
and simultaneous placing of a new zone on the municpal zoning map.
The New York Court of Appeals has ruled that a floating zone is
included in a comprehensive plan.2 9 The court determined that the
plan covered both the municipal map and the uses provided for in the
ordinance but not yet placed on the map. 80 The expansive view re-
flected by the New York decisions appears to be the preferable one for
planned unit developments, the desirability and placement of which
is often determined by the more general development of the munici-
pality. Municipal planning experts agree with this analysis. One writes:
The wave of the future in terms of planned unit development de-
pends upon the continued expansion and acceptance of the float-
ing zone concept . . . . Actual map-located districts are the
120. Rockhill v. Township of Chesterfield, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 127-28, 128 A.2d at 479-80.
123. 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
124. Id. at 217, 164 A.2d at 11.
125. Marino v. Zoning Bd., 1 Pa. Cmwlth. 116, 274 A.2d 221, 224-25 (1971).
126. See, e.g, Donahue v. Zoning Rd. of Adjustment, 412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610
(1963).
127. Id. at 334, 194 A.2d at 611.
128. Id.
129. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
130. Id. at 125-26, 96 N.E.2d at 735-36.
[Vol. 511476
PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
end to be achieved; they are not the required mechanisms for de-
velopment.
18'
With no direct precedent prohibiting the use of floating zones and
with one case apparently approving the concept sub silentio the North
Carolina court should accept the New York court's reasoning and allow
the floating zone as a valid technique under North Carolina enabling
legislation.
Other issues surrounding the use and placement of planned unit
developments by floating zones concern necessary give and take and
compromise between the developer, the planning board, and the mu-
nicipal legislative body in the submission, approval, and alteration
of a proposed development. 132  These problems are beyond the scope
of this comment.133  The particular implementation problems have
been recognized and solved in other jurisdictions and may survive at-
tack in North Carolina." 4
The use and enforcement of traditional Euclidean municipal zon-
ing is responsible for the present demographic composition of most
North Carolina municipalities. That composition is characterized by
(1) land segregation according to use, and (2) standardized lot size
and construction requirements. Recent trends toward construction
of multi-unit housing and demands by consumers in the housing mar-
ket for recreation and convenient commercial facilities suggest a need
to recognize new housing options.'35 A planned unit development,
appropriately designed and properly regulated, could fulfill the housing
needs of a community, provide for recreation and "green" area within
the municipality, and at the same time exist in harmony with the natural
environment.' 36 However, present enabling legislation and court de-
cisions make treacherous the use of planned unit development design.
One solution to the problem of potential attacks on planned unit
development in traditional zoning terms would be the enactment of
appropriate enabling legislation. The statute could be simple and gen-
eral'3 7 or more detailed and complete.138  Without enabling legisla-
131. Aloi, supra note 17, at 37.
132. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 65, at 80-87.
133. For a thorough discussion of the procedural considerations concerning the
implementation of planned unit developments, see Krasnowiecki, supra note 67.
134. See, e.g., Aloi, supra note 17, at 15-42; Comment, Planned Unit Develop-
ment, 35 Mo. L. REv. 27 (1970).
135. See text accompanying notes 58-64 supra.
136. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
137. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 40.55-54 to -67 (1967). The New Jersey Stat-
ute, entitled the Municipal Planned Unit Development Act, sets out a complete procedure
for application, consideration and approval of planned unit developments, The st-
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tion, developers will have to present and possibly litigate their propos-
als in traditional zoning terms. This effort could be facilitated by a re-
evaluation of recent contract and spot zoning holdings in the specific
context of planned unit development procedures. The strictest interpre-
tation of Blades and Allred does not leave much room for officially
sanctioned negotiation between developers and municipal officials over
the details of a planned unit development. If rezoning were challenged
under the authority of these cases, it would probably be found invalid.
The problem of conflict between traditional and use regulations
and new land development proposals is not limited to planned unit
developments or to North Carolina. Simply stated, zoning was con-
ceived and developed to keep land uses separated. Modern planning
techniques are concerned with how to put uses together in a com-
plete interacting system. Both approaches are valid, and both are
necessary in modem municipalities. It is important, then, to insure
that local officials and local developers have as wide a spectrum of
housing and construction options as reasonably possible. Approval of
planned unit developments as one means of local land development
would surely increase the likelihood of creativity and innovation in mu-
nicipal and community construction.
LEE A. PATTERSON II
ute requires municipalities enacting planned unit development ordinances under it to
set out the standards and conditions under which a planned unit development will be
permitted. Id. § 40.55-57 (1967). The act includes sections setting out procedures
for enforcement and modification of provisions of the planned unit development plan,
including a requirement of tentative and final approval of the plan by municipal offi-
cials. Id. §§ 40.55-58 to -63 (1967).
138. See, e.g., N.Y. TowN AW § 281 (McKinney 1965), as amended, (Supp.
1972). The statutory allowance of planned unit developments in New York is set out
in the following language of § 281:
The town board is hereby empowered . . . to authorize the planning
board . . . to modify applicable provisions of the zoning ordinance, subject to
the conditions as the town board may in its discretion add thereto. . . . The
purpose of such authorization shall be to enable and encourage flexibility of
design and development of land in such a manner as to promote the most
appropriate use of land, to facilitate the adequate and economical provision
of streets and utilities, and to preserve the natural and scenic qualities of
open lands.
Modification of the zoning requirements is subject to the following conditions: that ap-
plication for the use of this procedure be made to the city governing board in writing,
id. § 281(a) (McKinney 1965); that the number of buildings or dwelling units not ex-
ceed the number allowed under a traditional zoning scheme, id. § 281(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1972); that the town may require reservation of open space, id. § 281(c)
(McKinney Supp. 1972); that the town planning board may review the original plans
for the development and any modification of them, Id. § 281(e) (McKinney 1965);
and that use of this procedure cannot authorize changes in the permissible use of the
land to be developed from that permitted under the original ordinance, Id. § 281
(g) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
